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Distributing the Costs of Nuclear Core Melts
Japan’s Experience after 7 Years
Eri Kanamori, and Tomas Kåberger1 
Abstract
The costs of managing the consequences of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear have 
been significant already, and the estimated total future costs have increased over 
time. The immediate payments have been possible by direct payments from the 
Japanese government. However, most these payments are not acknowledged as 
government spending. Instead, a complicated system of envisioned re-payments 
have been created.
Based on the three Special Business Plans published by TEPCO since the 
nuclear disaster, this evolving perception of the economic consequences and 
the increasingly complicated repayment schemes are described. 
The conclusion of the authors are that the repayment schemes are not com-
patible with a future efficient, competitive electricity market.
It is suggested that other governments who implicitly or explicitly accepting 
economic liabilities for nuclear accidents prepare themselves in order to avoid 
un-necessary indirect cost after future reactors accidents.
1 Eri Kanamori, Ritsumeikan University, Osaka, Japan, kanamori@ba.ritsumei.ac.jp; 
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1 Background
In this paper, we attempt to describe the way the Government of Japan (GOJ) and 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) have managed to cope with the successively 
increasing acknowledged costs of the Fukushima core melts-downs, and following 
radioactivity leaks in 2011. The evolving scheme of dealing with the cost are found 
in TEPCO’s special business plans. 
But first, in this paper, a short description of the consequences of the core melts 
and of Japan’s national energy policy. This, as a background in order to understand 
the challenges of TEPCO and the design of their recent special business plans:
It was on March 11, 2011 that the three operating TEPCO reactors at Fukus-
hima-Daiichi nuclear power plants proved unable to cope with the effects of an 
earthquake. The nuclear reactor core melts in Fukushima and consecutive explo-
sions resulted is emission of radioactive substances into the air and water. Despite 
winds bringing most of the air emissions out into the Pacific, there was also some 
contamination on land, and over a hundred thousand people were instructed to 
evacuate their homes, while many in addition relocated at their own initiative, 
without evacuation orders.
Systematic, comprehensive studies of health effects are not published. Only 
increased thyroid cancer among children in the affected areas are documented 
[Tsuda et al. 2015], but sometimes denied to have any relation to the contamina-
tion. Thus economic measures of health costs are uncertain and not included in 
the official cost estimates.
The efforts to control the emissions are still engaging in the order of 5 000 people 
at Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. This is many more than the number 
of people employed when the plant produced electricity.
Removing spent fuel from damaged fuel pools, pumping contaminated water 
into new-built storage tanks by 2018 containing a million cubic meters, building 
treatment plants extracting as many radioactive isotopes as possible, and constructing 
an ice wall around the reactors in order to reduce the amount of water flowing into 
the most contaminated parts of the plant are some of the short-term efforts. For 
the longer term, attempts are made to find out where the melted reactor fuel is, and 
then to develop technologies and strategies for the long term decommissioning of 
the plant. The work can be followed at the web-site of TEPCO. [TEPCO 2011–2018]
Estimating the total cost from the accident until all the remains of the reactors 
are brought to a condition where further spreading of radioactivity will be avoided 
in the very long term is difficult.
The purpose of this paper is not to describe the long-term technical solutions, 
nor the long term financial solutions. This introduction was intended as a sketchy 
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background to the financial challenges of managing the consequences. The intention 
with this paper is to provide a description of how the short-term costs have been 
managed in Japan since the accident.
Similarly, a brief background of the energy policy follows to understand the way 
the consequences have been managed: 
Japan’s energy policy since the 1970s has focused on the development of nuclear 
power. Despite the absence of domestic uranium reserves, the import of this fuel has 
been seen as less problematic than dependence on fossil fuel imports. Uranium is 
easier to store, and a reprocessing ambition, making breeder reactors or production 
of mixed oxide fuels possible, made the envisioned future import volumes small 
compared to oil dependence. 
Despite strong political backing, the nuclear strategy encountered problems. 
New reactors were expensive, slowing down the expansion. Even operation of ex-
isting reactors have faced problems and the peak in nuclear electricity generation 
was as early as 1998, with 327 terawatt-hours (TWh) delivered. Still, the last full 
year before the 2011 Fukushima failure, more than 290 TWh were produced by 54 
nuclear reactors in Japan. [BP, 2017]
The Fukushima-Daiichi failure was a serious disaster. Still the “4th Strategic 
Energy Plan” [GOJ, 2014], a cabinet decision made in April 2014, which is the basic 
and comprehensive Japanese energy policy today, aims at the “Re-establishment of 
nuclear energy policy” (p.47). The plan says that “Nuclear power is an important 
base-load power source as a low carbon and quasi-domestic energy source, con-
tributing to stability of energy supply-demand structure, on the major premise of 
ensuring its´  safety” (p.24). It also says that “Even after the TEPCO’s Fukushima 
nuclear accident, use of nuclear energy is expected to expand in the world. The scale 
of the expansion is particularly remarkable in Asian nations where energy demand 
is rapidly increasing. Japan, with its experience of the accident, is expected to make 
contributions in the fields of safety, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security 
as an advanced nuclear nation” (p.50). The latest “5th Strategic Energy Plan” [GOJ, 
2018] holds the same attitude.
From these statements, it is obvious that Japan’s energy policy is still supporting 
nuclear power. Under this national policy, TEPCO’s special business plans have 
been made and, as we shall describe below, approved by the Government. In the 
national policy, allocation of the Fukushima costs is not explicitly dealt with. Thus 
the costs are not visible in the national budget, and not described as a cost of the 
government. Instead, the matter has been included in TEPCO’s special business 
plans. It is assumed in Japan from provisions of the “Act on Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage” that only TEPCO is responsible for the accident while the Gov-
ernment is not.
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While the government is prescribing how to manage the costs, and in fact pro-
viding the necessary funds, the roles of the current government and future tax- and 
ratepayers are not clearly presented and rarely debated in public.
This paper is an analysis of how the three consecutive special business plans for 
TEPCO, published after the accident, have evolved; How they present the solution 
of the challenging task of finding the money necessary to manage the immediate 
costs of the failure in reactor control after the earthquake.
2 TEPCO’s special business plans 
In the 2012 special business plan of TEPCO, the acknowledged costs for Fukushima 
were estimated as 25 billion euros.2 (Figure 1) This is to pay compensation to victims 
who were ordered to evacuate from defined areas in the Fukushima prefecture. 
In the 2014 plan, the estimated costs became 106 billion euros and it included 
not only compensation but also some decontamination, interim storage, and de-
commissioning. And in the 2017 plan, the total costs were assessed as 215 billion 
euros. The scheme of dealing with these costs will be explained chronologically.

Fig. 1 The estimated cost of Fukushima accident
2 In this paper, 1 trillion yen is assumed equal to 10 billion euros. In 2018, this is only the 
right order of magnitude as one Euro is close to 130 JPY.
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2.1 The 2012 TEPCO Special Business Plan
In the 2012 plan (TEPCO, 2012a), called “Comprehensive Special Business Plan”, 
Fukushima costs were seen as only compensation and estimated at 25 billion euros. 
In the financial year ending 31 March 2011, TEPCO recorded a 12 billion euros 
net loss. This net loss was mainly from asset impairment and efforts to cool and 
control reactors. Because of the proven loss, TEPCO’s equity was eroded from 21 
billion euros in 2009/2010 to 12 billion euros in 2010/2011 (non-consolidated), 
despite raising a few billions from issuing new shares in October 2010. So, the 25 
billion euros of compensation was already bigger than TEPCO’s equity. Thus, this 
early estimated expense was unaffordable for the company. Under normal economic 
conditions of limited liability companies in the world, this should have resulted in 
a bankruptcy where shareholders lost their assets in the company.
However, the government of Japan, instead, decided to rescue the shareholders. 
The government provided 25 billion euros to TEPCO, for the company to be able to 
pay compensation, and an additional 10 billion euros in exchange for TEPCO’s new, 
emitted shares giving the government ownership of 54.69%. This prevented TEPCO 
from going bankrupt and gave incumbent shareholders an opportunity to stay as 
owner. At the same time the government avoided making unlimited commitments.
The 10 billion euros payment was mainly to make TEPCO able to pay for its 
ongoing business activity, such as buying additional fuels and paying interests to 
banks. Strictly speaking, the government did not do it directly, but through the 
“Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Corporation” (NDF) which they created 
after Fukushima. As a result, it is the NDF that holds 54.69% of TEPCO’s shares 
and TEPCO is now controlled by the Government via the NDF.
The scheme of 2012 plan is shown in Figure 2, above. The two government aids 
are shown as arrows 1 and 2. Arrow 1 shows that the NDF provided 25 billion euros 
for TEPCO to pay compensation to victims. In order to do this, the Government 
provided its bonds of 50 billion euros to the NDF. These government bonds were 
issued for special purpose of supporting compensation and had three features 
which are different from ordinary bonds: yielding no interests, prohibited to be 
transferred to a third party, and ready to be redeemed at any time on demand for 
the purpose. Therefore, when the NDF needed cash in order to assist TEPCO pay-
ing compensation, and the NDF demanded it officially to the GOJ, the NDF could 
acquire cash at any time. From 2012 onwards, the redemption has been repeated 
monthly. The Government derived the cash from its annual energy budget. It seems 
that there was already a concern that 25 billion euros might not be sufficient for pay-
ing compensation, since the government special purpose bond was up to 50 billion 
euros already at this stage. At the same time, as arrows 2 show, the NDF invested 
358 Eri Kanamori, and Tomas Kåberger 
10 billion euros in 54.69% of TEPCO’s share. To finance this additional aid, the 
NDF borrowed the money from banks based on a guarantee from the government.
Fig. 2 The scheme of the 2012 plan
The money for compensation to victims, it is said, will be paid back to the NDF in a 
complicated way. A new law was imposed whereby the responsibility to contribute 
to repayment was shared between all nuclear operators. 
In other countries, the liable party would be a matter for courts under existing 
laws. Here, the Japanese government and diet retroactively distributed the economic 
liability to all nuclear operators. It may be seen as a retroactive insurance fee that 
could have been imposed on them beforehand. 
As the electricity system, at the time, was operated by regional, vertically inte-
grated, monopolies, costs were easily passed on to electricity customers. While an 
insurance fee, in a competitive market economy, would have given consumers the 
opportunity to opt for lower cost sources of electricity, the retroactive charge and 
the monopoly in the market simply forced customers to pay.
In Figure 2, arrows with the number 3 represent the planned process of re-
payment. The money is called “contributions.” There are “general contributions” 
from TEPCO and other nuclear operators and “special contributions” only from 
TEPCO. In the year of 2016, TEPCO and other operators paid about 1.6 billion 
euros as general contributions and TEPCO paid an additional 1.1 billion euros. It 
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was considered that the payment of contributions would last for ten years or so. 
Of course, this money is expected to continue to come from electricity consumers.
2.2 The 2014 TEPCO Special Business Plan 
In 2014, the “New Comprehensive Special Business Plan” was established which 
disclosed that not only compensation payments would be needed, but also paying 
for decontamination, interim storage and decommissioning (TEPCO, 2014). The 
estimated compensation cost was doubled from 25 to 50 billion euros. Decontam-
ination costs of 25 billion euros, interim storage of 11 billion euros and decommis-
sioning of 20 billion euros were now taken into consideration.
Fig. 3 The scheme of the 2014 plan
Arrows with the number 1, in Figure 3, show how TEPCO was expected to pay 50 
billion euros in compensation to victims, the NDF provides the same amount in 
order for TEPCO to do this. The system for planned repayments stayed the same 
as in the 2012 plan. The obvious change being that total “contributions” increased 
to 50 billion euros (arrows numbered with 3).
As for decontamination and interim storage, the two costs are shown together in 
Figure 3 for practical reasons, and the total amount was 36 billion euros. The NDF 
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directly makes payments for decontamination and interim storage, not through 
TEPCO’s financial statements. To cover this 36 billion euros, GOJ issued additional 
special purpose bonds of 40 billion euro. Therefore the total bonds provided to NDF 
increased from 50 to 90 billion euros (arrow numbered 1 from GOJ to the NDF). 
The next question was how to arrange the pay back of this latter amount. As 
seen before, the contribution from TEPCO and other nuclear operators remained 
50 billion euros, which is the same amount of compensation (arrows numbered 3). 
Nuclear power companies would not want to, and could not, increase electricity 
charges further, as a re-regulation process introducing some competition in the 
electricity sector had started and such obligations would weaken the competitiveness 
of the companies with nuclear power. 
Instead new ways of repayment were invented; capital gain and a special tax. It 
was planned that 25 billion euros for decontamination is to be covered by imagined 
future capital gain of TEPCO’s share which the NDF holds, termed capital gain. 
The 11 billion euros of interim storage costs shall come from the Government 
energy budget (arrows 4). 
As for the last category of Fukushima cost, 20 billion euros of decommissioning 
of Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant is planned to be financed by TEPCO’s 
management effort through cost reduction and sales of assets (arrow 5). This is a 
very ambitious task for TEPCO management, considering the plans to increase 
competition in the Japanese markets. And all this, while electricity consumption is 
falling, and decentralised solar electricity is increasing its’ market share. To be able 
to collect the benefits of efficiency as profit, the achieved efficiency improvements 
must not only cover this cost compared to today operations, the improvements must 
be so much better than improvements among competitors, in order to generate the 
profit necessary to cover the costs.
In addition, there was one more important feature in the decommissioning 
scheme of 2014 plan. GOJ began to support research and development (R&D) 
of decommissioning methods applicable to the crippled reactors in Fukushima 
(arrow 6). It is unknown how much the NDF will pay for R&D of Fukushima 
decommissioning. The law was changed and NDF before abbreviation was, as a 
consequence, renamed as “Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning 
Facilitation Corporation”, and the function of decommissioning facilitation was 
added to NDF. (GOJ, 2014, p.48)
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2.3 The 2017 TEPCO Special Business Plan
The 2017 plan revealed that Fukushima estimated cost increased to 215 billion 
euros (TEPCO, 2017). Compensation, decontamination, interim storage and de-
commissioning were given as 79 billion, 40 billion, 16 billion, and 80 billion euros 
respectively. The scheme to cover costs became even more complex. 
Fig. 4 The scheme of the 2017 plan
Firstly, compensation of 79 billion euros is provided by the NDF as in the 2014 plan 
(arrows 1). But changes were made in the repayment process. The contribution did 
not go up to 79 billion euros. Instead, a part of the compensation was to be repaid 
through a new channel: from a transmission charge (arrows 7). This, in practice, 
means that the economic liability for the nuclear accident consequences will be paid 
also by customers who are buying no nuclear electricity at all. The interpretation 
that the contribution was a retroactive insurance payment by all nuclear operators 
is now no longer possible. Instead all electricity consumers are paying.
TEPCO’s consumers split into two groups after April 2016 when some compe-
tition was introduced in the Japanese electricity retail market. Some consumers 
remained TEPCO’s customers and continued to pay electricity charges to TEPCO. 
Others switched retailers and are now paying electricity charges to other suppliers. 
TEPCO could not collect money from the latter consumers anymore. 
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So, the new way of collecting money from these consumers by using transmission 
charge was invented. Now, TEPCO’s customers pay additional charges to TEPCO. 
And PPS who use transmission services of TEPCO also pay an extra charge. This 
charge is set to yield the 24 billion euros needed to pay back to the NDF and GOJ 
together with the contributions. Accordingly, the contribution becomes 55 billion 
euros in total. In other words, 55 billion euros (arrows 3) and 24 billion euros 
(arrows 7), both charged on consumers, will be used to pay back to the money of 
compensation.
Next is decontamination and interim storage. In the 2017 plan, the total cost of 
the two was 56 billion euros. But this amount cannot be financed by the 90 billion 
which the NDF provided to TEPCO in the 2014 plan, because from that sum, they 
already pay compensation of 79 billion euros. So, in the 2017 plan, the Government 
decided to provide additional bonds of 45 billion euros, resulting in total amount 
of 135 billion euros (arrows 1). The repayment scheme of the two costs is the same 
as 2014 plan: Decontamination of 40 billion euros is to be paid back from capital 
gain, while interim storage of 16 billion is from Government’s energy budget which 
means from other tax income or further national borrowing.
It might be necessary to note here that the anticipated capital gain of 40 billion 
euros is not a credible expectation in the absence of any privilege given to TEPCO 
in the future competitive electricity market. The NDF holds 54.69% of TEPCO’s 
share, after paying about 10 billion euros. In order to get 40 billion euros capital 
gain, the share price must increase to 50 billion euros. 50 billion euro for half of 
TEPCO means around 100 billion euro for 100% of the company. Therefore, TEP-
CO’s market value in the future must become more than 100 billion euros. This 
is hard to imagine if customers in Japan are to enjoy electricity at prices that can 
make industrial customers competitive, and give households a decent standard. The 
reality among large peers in Europe is that Edf, with roughly the dubble installed 
generation capacity to TEPCO had a market value of some 20 billion euros at the 
end of 2016.
Finally, decommissioning costs, that are estimated to be 80 billion euros in the 
2017 plan, will be financed by TEPCO’s management efforts. There is no change 
about this scheme. Then, what is TEPCO’s management efforts in 2017 plan? In 
Fuel/Thermal Power business, TEPCO plans to reduce maintenance cost by 30% 
(TEPCO, 2017, p.28). This, again, is very ambitious. It is so, not only considering 
the Fukushima events but in relation to the track record of TEPCOs management 
before 2011. Pursuing cost cuts must not affect the safety of its business and the 
efforts to avoid more accidents. This is particularly relevant in the nuclear business, 
where they are planning to restart of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power station 
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(TEPCO, 2017, p.37), a plant that has experienced severe difficulties in operation 
even before the Fukushima failure. 
In Transmission and Distribution business, the plan says that TEPCO will 
raise 1.2 billion euro/year on average through rationalization (TEPCO, 2017, p.30). 
Rationalization, again means cost reductions. If this is possible, one may ask why 
it has not been done already.
3 Discussion
The full costs of the Fukushima nuclear reactor core melts are not yet possible 
to quantify. Still, the costs already identified and acknowledged by the Japanese 
government are so large they are beyond the paying capacity of any reactor owner 
in the world, and clearly beyond the paying capacity of TEPCO.
In a stepwise process, the unavoidable costs of the Fukushima disaster have been 
identified and distributed by the Japanese government. Worth noting, is that in 
this process the government has protected TEPCO owners from bankruptcy. This 
could be seen as introducing a moral hazard: While the report by National Diet of 
Japan Accident Investigation Committee has concluded TEPCO is responsible for 
the consequences by neglecting warning of earthquakes and tsunamis, pointing out 
that “Risk of the arrival of a tsunami was known by both Nuclear and Industrial 
Safety Agency and TEPCO in 2006, but TEPCO neglected this risk and no meas-
ures were taken” (1.2 of PART 1), TEPCO has been protected from the economic 
consequences by the government. The government has placed the economic cost 
and responsibility on the customers and tax payers, but not on the owners of the 
plant. The moral hazard appear as other industries may come to expect similar 
protection and abstain from taking costly precautions when learning about risks 
in their activities.
Now, the Japanese people are compelled to pay for most of the costs. Still, the 
schemes set up for this purpose. The complexity of the plans, and the lack of trans-
parency in reporting the use of money provided by the Governments or regulated 
contributions collected from ratepayers, makes public debate and democratic 
control difficult or impossible.
Some part of the plan deserves public scrutiny as the current government plans 
may appear unrealistic, thus creating problems and deficits for future Governments. 
It is for example hard to believe that a 40 billion euros capital gain will be secured 
by TEPCO in the competitive electricity markets that exists in most countries and 
that is now also said to be developed in Japan. Similarly, it is hard to believe that 
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significant profits can be made by cost reducing management efforts if the markets 
are really competitive. These plans seem to rely on assumptions about electric 
power companies being able to in some way tax consumers rather that supplying 
in a competitive market.
Thus one may see these plans as only postponing the understanding of what the 
government is going to have to provide through increasing taxes on the Japanese 
people in an already weak government budget situation.
4 Conclusions
Seven years after the nuclear core melts the experience shows a lack of readiness, 
and absence of any plan for how to manage the economic consequences of an 
accident of this magnitude. 
Still, the improvised solutions, have for the seven years both kept the govern-
ment’s borrowing capacity intact, and allowed TEPCO to avoid going bankrupt. 
We dare predict that the 2017 TEPCO Special Business Plan will be impossible 
to fulfil. Further improvised and complicated solutions may follow. However, it is 
increasingly unlikely that the current idea of nuclear power companies in different 
ways paying will be compatible with the global development of low cost renewable 
electricity generation technology and competitive electricity markets. Instead the 
development appears likely to make it impossible to generate profits by nuclear or 
other large scale thermal power plants. Even without the Fukushima related liabil-
ities, Japan’s electric power companies would have economic challenges.
A less complex solution, worth investigating further, would be that the gov-
ernment directly takes over all the nuclear liabilities from the power companies 
and have the power companies paying by transferring the transmission network 
to a government controlled national transmission system operator. That solution 
would support, rather than conflict with, the ongoing electricity market reform, 
and transition to low cost electricity. It would, in one move, unbundle transmission 
from generation and create the conditions necessary for an efficient electricity 
market reducing costs for Japan’s future electricity supply.
The experience is also relevant when considering restarting reactors, re-introduc-
ing the risks of further reactor accidents in Japan. Had Japan seen winds bringing 
more contamination over land – or even worse, in the direction of Tokyo – the 
financial consequences may not have been manageable by the government or the 
Japanese society by itself. 
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This observation leads to the need to find market based solutions that will 
distribute costs globally. Here the idea of a compulsory insurance via catastrophe 
bonds appears as an option deserving further consideration [Radetzki & Radetzki 
2000, Kåberger 2018].
The experience of Japan may prove valuable for consideration also in other 
nuclear countries. Though many of these are operating under different legislation 
and international conventions regarding liability for reactor accidents, the real 
magnitude of the economic consequences are often not understood by people 
within the democratic decision making processes in Europe or North America.
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